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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a model of international competition in an 
oligopoly characterized by strong learning effects. The model is 
quantified by calibrating its parameters to reproduce the U.S.-
Japanese rivalry in 16K RAMS from 1978-1983. We then ask the following 
question: how much did the apparent closure of the Japanese market to 
imports affect Japan's export performance? A simulation analysis 
suggests that a protected home market was a crucial advantage to 
Japanese firms, which would otherwise have been uncompetitive both at 
home and abroad. We find, however, that Japan's home market protec-
tion nonetheless produced more costs than benefits for Japan. 
This paper appeared as #1936 in the NBER Working Paper Series, June 1986-
The technology by which complex circuits can be etched and 
printed onto a tiny silicon chip is a remarkable one. Until the late 
1970s it was also a technology clearly dominated by the United States. 
Thus it was a rude shock when Japanese competition became a serious 
challenge to established US firms, and when Japan actually came to 
dominate the manufacture of one important kind of chip, the Random 
Access Memory (RAM). More perhaps than any other event, Japan's 
breakthrough in RAMs has raised doubts about whether the traditional 
American reliance on laissez-faire toward the commercialization of 
technology is going to remain viable. 
There are two main questions raised by shifting advantage in 
semiconductor production. One is whether it matters who produces 
semiconductors in general, or RAMs in particular. That is, does the 
production of RAMs yield important country-specific external 
economies? This is, of course, the $64K question. It is also an 
extremely difficult question to answer. Externalities are inherently 
hard to measure, because by definition they do not leave any trace in 
market transactions. Ultimately the discussion of industrial policy 
will have to come to grips with the assessment of externalities, but 
for the time being we will shy away from that task. 
In this paper we will instead focus on the other question. This 
is where the source of the shift in advantage lies. Did Japan simply 
acquire a comparative advantage through natural causes, or was 
government targeting the key factor? 
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Although strong views can be found on both sides, this is also 
not an easy question to answer. On one side, Japanese policy did not 
involve large subsidies. The tools of policy were instead 
encouragement with modest government support of a joint research 
venture, the Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) project, and tacit 
encouragement of a closure of domestic markets to imports. Given that 
Japan became a large scale exporter of chips, a conventional economic 
analysis would suggest that government policy could not have mattered 
very much. 
Semiconductor manufacture, however, is not an industry where 
conventional economic analysis can be expected to be a good guide. It 
is an extraordinarily dynamic industry, where technological change 
reduced the real price of a unit of computing capacity by 99 percent 
from 1974 to 1984. This technological change did not fall as manna 
from heaven; it was largely endogenous, the result of R&D and 
learning-by-doing. As a result, competition was marked by dynamic 
economies of scale that led to a fairly concentrated industry, at 
least within the RAM market. So semiconductors is a dynamic oligopoly 
rather than the static competitive market to which conventional 
analysis applies. 
Now it is possible to show that in a dynamic oligopoly the 
policies followed by Japan could in principle have made a large 
difference. In particular, a protected domestic market can serve as a 
springboard for exports (Krugman 1984). The question, however, is how 
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important this effect has been. If the Japanese market had been as 
open as US firms would have liked, would this have radically altered 
the story, or would it have made only a small difference? There is no 
way to answer this question without a quantitative model of the 
competitive process. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a preliminary assessment 
of the importance of market access in one important episode in the 
history of semiconductor competition. This is the case of the 16K RAM, 
the chip in which Japan first became a significant exporter. Our 
question is whether the alleged closure of the Japanese market could 
have been decisive in allowing Japan to sell not only at home but in 
world markets as well. The method of analysis is the development of a 
simulation model, derived from recent theoretical work, and 
"calibrated" to actual data. The technique is in the same spirit as 
the recent paper on the auto industry by Dixit (1985). 
Obviously we are interested in the actual results of this 
analysis. As we will see, the analysis suggests that privileged access 
to the domestic market was in fact decisive in giving Japanese firms 
the ability to compete in the world market as well. The analysis also 
suggests, however, that this "success" was actually a net loss to the 
Japanese economy. Finally, the attempt to construct a simulation model 
here raises many difficult issues, to such an extent that the results 
must be treated quite cautiously. 
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The modelling endeavor has a secondary purpose, however, which 
may be more important than the first. This is to conduct a trial run 
of the application of new trade theories to real data. It is our view 
that RAMs are a uniquely rewarding subject for such a trial run. On 
one hand, the product is well defined: RAMs are a commodity, in the 
sense that RAMs from different firms are near-perfect substitutes and 
can in fact be mixed in the same device. Indeed, successive 
generations of RAMs are still good substitutes — a 16K RAM is pretty 
close in its use to four 4K RAMs, and so on. On the other hand, the 
dynamic factors that new theory emphasizes are present in RAMs to an 
almost incredible degree. The pace of technological change in RAMs is 
so rapid that other factors can be neglected, in much the same way 
that non-monetary factors can be neglected in studying hyperinflation. 
This paper is in five parts. The first part provides background 
on the industry. The second part develops the theoretical model 
underlying the simulation. In the third part we explain how the model 
was "calibrated" to the data. In the fourth part we describe and 
discuss simulations of the industry under alternative policies. 
Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the significance of 
the results and directions for further research. 
THE RANDOM ACCESS MEMORY MARKET 
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Technology and the growth of the industry 
So-called dynamic random access memories are a particular 
general-purpose kind of semiconductor chip. What a RAM does is to 
store information in digital form, in such a way as to allow that 
information to be altered (hence "dynamic") and read in any desired 
order (hence "random access"). The technique of production for 16K 
RAMs involved the etching of circuits on silicon chips by a 
combination of photographic techniques and chemical baths, followed by 
baking. The advantage of this method of manufacture, in addition to 
the microscopic scale on which components are fabricated, is that in 
effect thousands of electronic devices are manufactured together with 
the wires that connect them, all in a single step. The disadvantage, 
if there is one, is that the process is a very sensitive one. If a 
chip is to work, everything — temperature, timing, density of 
solutions, vibration levels, dust — must be precisely controlled. 
Getting these details right is as much a matter of trial and error as 
it is a science. 
The sensitivity of the manufacturing process gives rise to a very, 
distinctive form of learning-by-doing. Suppose that a semiconductor 
chip has been designed and the manufacturing process worked out. Even 
so, when production begins the yield of usable chips will ordinarily 
be very low. That is, chips will be produced, but most of them — 
often 95 percent — will not work, because in some subtle way the 
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conditions for production were not quite right. Thus the manufacturing 
process is in large part a matter of experimenting with details over 
time. As the details are gotten right, the yield rises sharply. Even 
at the end, however, many chips still fail to work. 
Technological progress in the manufacture of chips has had a more 
or less regular rhythm in which fundamental improvements alternate 
with learning-by-doing within a given framework. In the case of RAMs 
the fundamental innovations have involved packing ever more components 
onto a chip, through the use of more sophisticated methods of etching 
the circuits. Given the binary nature of everything in this industry, 
each such leap forward has involved doubling the previous density; 
since chips are two-dimensional, each such doubling of density 
quadruples the number of components. Thus the successive generations 
of RAMs have been the 4K (4x210), the 16K, the 64K, and the 256K. 
Basically a 16K chip does four times as much as a 4K, and given time 
costs not much more to produce, so the succession of generations 
creates a true product cycle in which each generation becomes more or 
less throroughly replaced by the next. 
Table 1 shows how the sucessive generations of RAMs have entered 
the market, and how the price has fallen. To interpret the data, bear 
in mind that one unit of each generation of RAM is roughly equivalent 
to four units of the previous generation. The pattern of product 
cycles then becomes clear. The effective output of 16K RAMs was 
already larger than that of 4Ks in 1978, and the effective price was 
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clearly lower by 1979. The 16K RAM was in its turn overtaken in output 
in 1981, in price in 1982. As of the time of writing the 64K has not 
yet been overtaken by 256K RAMs. Missing from the table, as well, is a 
collapse in RAM prices during 1985, to levels as little as a tenth of 
those of a year earlier. 
From an economist's point of view, the most important question 
about a technology is not how it works but how it is handled by a 
market system. This boils down largely to the questions of 
appropriability and externality. Can the firm that develops a 
technological improvement keep others from imitating it long enough to 
reap the rewards of its cleverness? Do others gain from a firm's 
innovations (other than from its improved product or reduced prices)? 
When we examine international competition, we also want to know 
whether external benefits, to the extent that they are generated, are 
national or international in scope. 
From the nature of what is being learned, there seem to be clear 
differences between the two kinds of technological progress in the 
semiconductor industry. When a new generation of chips is introduced, 
the knowledge involved seems to be of kinds that are relatively hard 
to maintain as private property. Basic techniques of manufacture are 
hard to keep secret, and in any case respond to current trends in 
science and "metatechnology". Thus everyone knew in the late 1970s 
that a 64K RAM was possible, and roughly speaking how it was going to 
be done. Furthermore, even the details of chip design are essentially 
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impossible to disguise: firms can and do make and enlarge photographs 
of rivals' chips to see how their circuits are laid out. Also, the 
ability of firms to learn from each other is not noticeably restricted 
by national boundaries. 
The details of manufacture, as learned over time in the process 
of gaining experience, are by contrast highly appropriable. The facts 
learned pertain to highly specific circumstances, and are indeed 
sometimes plant- as well as firm-specific. Unlike the design of the 
chips, the details of production are not evident in the final product. 
Thus the knowlege gained from learning-by-doing in this case is a 
model of a technology that poses few appropriability problems. 
It seems, then, that the basic innovations involved in passing 
from one generation to the next in RAMs are relatively hard to 
appropriate, while those involved in getting the technology to work 
within a generation are relatively easy to appropriate. This 
observation will be the basis of the key untrue assumption that we 
will make in implementing our simulation analysis. We will treat 
product cycles — the displacement of one generation by the next, 
better one — as completely exogenous. This will allow us to focus 
entirely on the competition within the cycle, in which technological 
progress takes place by learning. It will also allow us to put time 
bounds on this competition: a single product cycle becomes the natural 
unit of analysis. 
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Like any convenient assumption, this one does violence to 
reality. It is at least possible that the assumptions we make are in 
fact missing the key point of competition in this industry. For now, 
however, let us make our simplification and leave the critical 
discussion to the end of the paper. 
Market structure and trade policy 
Some fourteen firms produced 16K random access memories for the 
commercial market during the period 1977-83. Table 2 shows the average 
shares of these firms in world production during the period. Taken as 
a whole, the industry was not exceptionally concentrated, though far 
from competitive: the Herfindahl index for all firms, taking the 
average over the period, was only 0.099. This overstates the effective 
degree of competition, however, for two main reasons. First, some of 
the firms producing small quantities were probably producing 
specialized products in short production runs, and thus were really 
not producing the same commodity as the rest. Second, there was, as we 
will see shortly, a good deal of market segmentation between the US 
and Japan, so that each market was substantially more oligopolized 
than the figures suggest. Nonetheless, when we create a stylized 
version of the market for simulation purposes, we will want to make 
sure that the degree of competition is roughly consistent with this 
data. As it turns out, we will develop a model in which the baseline 
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case contains six symmetric US firms and three symmetric Japanese 
firms, which does not seem too far off. 
Another feature of the semiconductor industry's market structure 
does not show in the table. This is the contrast between the nature of 
the US firms and their Japanese rivals. The major US chip 
manufacturers shown here are primarily chip producers. (There is also 
"captive" US production by such firms as IBM and ATT, but during the 
period we are considering little of this production found its way to 
the open or "merchant" market). The Japanese firms, by contrast, are 
also substantial consumers of chips in their other operations. The 
Japanese firms are not, however, vertically integrated in the usual 
sense. Each buys most of its chips from other firms, while in turn 
selling most of its chip output to outside customers. There have been 
repeated accusations, however, that the major suppliers and buyers of 
Japanese semiconductor production — who are the same firms — collude 
to form a closed market and exclude foreign sources. 
The claim that the Japanese market was effectively closed rests 
on this difference in market structure. US firms argued that the buy-
Japanese policy of the major firms was tacitly and perhaps even 
explicitly encouraged by the government, so that even in the absence 
of any formal tariffs or quotas Japan was able to use a strategy of 
infant-industry protection to establish itself. It is beyond our 
ability to assess such claims, or to determine how important the 
government of Japan as opposed to its social structure was in closing 
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the market to foreigners. There is, however, circumstantial evidence 
of a less than open market. The evidence Is that of market shares. 
Consider Table 3 (which is subject to some problems; see the 
appendix). We see that US firms dominated both their own home market 
and third-country markets, primarily in Europe. Yet they had a small 
share in Japan, probably again in specialized types of RAMs rather 
than the basic commodity product. Transport costs for RAMs are small; 
they are, as we have stressed, commodity-like in their 
interchangeability. So the disparity in market shares suggests that 
some form of market closure was in fact happening. 
Here is where economic analysis comes in. We know that in an 
industry characterized by strong learning effects, as we have argued 
is the case here, protection of the home market can have a kind of 
multiplier effect. Privileged access to one market can give firms the 
assurance of moving further down their learning curves and thus 
encourage them to price aggressively in other markets as well. Our 
next task will be to develop a simulation model which can be used to 
ask how important this effect could have been in the case of RAMs. 
A THEORETICAL MODEL OF COMPETITION IN RAMS 
Learning, capacity, and prices 
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We have argued that a useful approximation to the nature of 
technological change in RAMs is to divide it into two kinds. Major 
technological change, the shift to a new capacity of chip, can be 
provisionally treated as an exogenous event, external to firms. Within 
each product cycle, however, increased yield of chips can be thought 
of as the endogenous result of learning-by-doing, internal to firms. 
This distinction makes it seem natural to analyze competition 
within each product cycle using the learning curve models of Spence 
(1981) and of Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). This was in fact our 
initial approach to the problem. We found, however, that while these 
models are in the right spirit, they have difficulty coping with a 
crucial aspect of the data: the pace at which output rises and prices 
fall within each product cycle. This forced us to modify the analysis. 
To understand this problem, consider Spence's simplest model — 
which is the one we would have liked to use. He assumes that firms 
face a product cycle of known length, short enough so that discounting 
can be ignored. At each point in this product cycle, a firm's marginal 
cost is a decreasing function of its cumulative output to date. (These 
are not bad approximations to the situation in RAMs). He also assumes 
that firms follow "open loop" strategies, ruling out the possibility 
of strategic moves to influence rivals' later behavior. 
Now the result of these assumptions is gratifyingly simple. 
Essentially the dynamic problem of the firm collapses into a static 
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one. The true marginal cost of a firm at any point is its direct 
marginal production cost, less the contribution of an additional unit 
of current output to reducing later costs. As the product cycle 
proceeds, the first term declines as experience is gained, but so does 
the second, because there is less future production to which cost 
savings can be applied. What Spence showed was that these two terms 
decline at exactly the same rate: true marginal cost remains constant 
over time. At the end of the product cycle, of course, the second term 
vanishes. Thus throughout the product cycle the marginal cost that is 
set equal to marginal revenue is simply the marginal cost of 
production of the last unit that will be produced. 
What is wrong with this analysis? Suppose that demand were 
constant. Then Spence's model would imply that each firm has constant 
marginal cost, and thus that both prices and output would remain 
constant over the cycle. This is clearly massively inconsistent with 
the data in Table 1. 
How can we resolve this conflict? One answer would be to adopt a 
more sophisticated learning curve model. We could, for instance, 
introduce discounting; this would, as Fudenberg and Tirole have shown, 
lead to a declining rather than a constant price. It is hard to 
believe, however, that this could explain a 90 percent decline over 
four years. Alternatively, we could follow Fudenberg and Tirole by 
letting firms follow closed loop strategies and thus allowing for 
strategic moves. If anything, however, this would seem to lead to 
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rising prices, because firms would try to aggressively establish an 
advantage in the first part of the product cycle, then reap the 
rewards later. Either of these solutions, furthermore, has the problem 
of spoiling the simplicity of Spence's formulation. The firm's dynamic 
problem can no longer be collapsed into a static one. This may be the 
truth, but we are looking for something that can be made operational, 
and it would be very desirable to have a simpler model. 
A clue to the resolution of this problem may be found by 
considering another disconcerting feature of Spence's model. Suppose 
again that demand is constant, and that therefore production remains 
constant. It follows, given rising efficiency, that the quantity of 
resources devoted to production is actually at its maximum at the 
beginning of the cycle, and declines steadily from then on. I.e., 
firms build plants, then gradually dismantle them as they become more 
efficient! This seems clearly implausible. Surely a better formulation 
is to suppose that resources, once committed to production, stay there 
throughout the product cycle. If this is the case, however, we can no 
longer treat marginal cost in the same way. Resources committed to 
production — call them "capacity" — are a sunk cost once they are in 
place. 
The view that productive resources in RAM production constitute a 
sunk cost, and that ex-post supply is inelastic, gains further 
strength from recent gyrations in prices. In the year and a half 
before this paper was written, RAM prices first fell by a factor of 
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ten, then tripled. These fluctuations could not happen if firms were 
able to move resources freely in and out of the sector. 
We have therefore adopted a model similar in spirit to the 
learning curve approach, but different in its dynamic implications. 
This is the "yield curve" model of production. At the beginning of the 
product cycle firms choose a level of capacity that they commit to 
production throughout the cycle. The output from any given level of 
capacity rises through time, as experience is gained. Since capacity 
is a sunk cost, firms sell whatever they produce, no matter what the 
price: having chosen capacity, firms must let the chips fall where 
they may. Since output rises with experience, price falls over time. 
This is the general idea; let us now turn to the specifics. 
The Yield Curve Model of Production 
Consider a firm that at the start of a product cycle commits some 
amount of resources to production. We will define one unit of capacity 
as the resources needed to produce one "batch" per unit of time (see 
below); let K be the capacity in which a firm invests. 
Now we will suppose that production takes the form of "batches": 
each period, one unit of capacity can be used to engrave and bake one 
batch of semiconductor chips. Thus the firm produces batches at a 
constant rate K throughout the cycle, and the total number of batches 
produced after t periods has passed is Kt. 
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In semiconductor production, however, much of a batch of chips 
will turn out not to work. The yield of usable chips per batch rises 
with experience. We will assume specifically that the yield of usable 
chips per batch, y(t), is a function of the total number of batches 
that a firm has made so far, K(t)t, according to the functional form 
(1) y(t) - [Kt]e 
(Obviously the functional form in (1) cannot be right for the 
whole range. It implies that the yield of usable chips per batch rises 
without limit as experience accumulates. In fact, yields cannot go 
above 100 percent, so something like a logistic would seem more 
reasonable. The functional form here is, however, a tremendous help in 
keeping the problem manageable. As long as the product cycle remains 
short, it may not be too bad an approximation). 
The total number of chips produced by a firm per unit time will 
then be 
(2) x(t) - Ky(t) = K 1 + et 8 
Now it is immediately and gratifyingly obvious that (2) behaves 
much as if there were ordinary inceasing returns to scale. Time enters 
in a way that is multiplicatively separable from capacity, so that the 
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rate of growth of output is in fact independent of the size of the 
firm. Although we started with a dynamic formulation, the advantages 
of greater experience show up as the fact that the exponent on K is 
larger than one, just as if the economies of scale were static and 
productivity growth were exogenous. 
It is also possible to show the analogy between this formulation 
and the conventional learning curve. In learning curve models it is 
usual to compare current average cost with cumulative experience. 
Although costs are all sunk in the yield curve model, current cost as 
measured would presumably be proportional to the capacity K. Thus 
current average cost would be measured as proportional to K/x(t). At 
the same time, cumulative output to date can be found by integrating 
(2). Let X(t) be cumulative output to time t, and let C(t) be the 
measured average cost of production cK/x(t), where c is the annualized 
cost of a unit of capacity. Then we have 
If we were to think of this as a conventional learning curve, 
then, e/(l+e) would be the slope of that learning curve. 
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The close parallels between our formulation and both static 
economies of scale, on one side, and the learning curve, on the other, 
are very helpful. Usually studies of technological change in 
semiconductors have been framed in terms of learning curves; what we 
can do is reinterpret the results of those studies in terms of a yield 
curve, transforming estimates of the learning curve elasticity to 
derive estimates of e. At the same time, the parallel with static 
economies of scale suggests a solution technique for our model, when 
it is fully specified: collapse it into an equivalent static model, 
and solve that model instead. We need to specify the demand side to 
show that in fact such a procedure is valid, but this will in the end 
be the technique we use. 
A final point about the assumed technology. The reason for 
assuming the yield curve as opposed to the learning curve model is 
that it implies growing output over the product cycle. Can we say 
anything more than this? The answer is that the specific formulation 
adopted here implies also that output grows at a declining rate. By 
taking logs and differentiating (2), we find that the rate of growth 
of output will decline according to the relationship 
The prediction of a declining rate of growth in output over the 
product cycle is borne out, except for a slight reversal at one point, 
by the data in Table 1. 
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Demand and trade 
Turning now to the demand side, we suppose that there are two 
markets, the US and Japan. We denote Japanese variables with an 
asterisk, while leaving US. variables unstarred. In each market there 
is a constant elasticity demand curve for output, which we write in 
inverse form as 
(4) P - AtTa 
(5) P * A*Q*~a 
We thus assume that the elasticity of demand, 1/a, is the same in both 
narkets. 
Firms will assumed to be located in one market or the other, and 
to be able to ship to the other market only by incurring an additional 
transport cost. Transport costs will be of the "iceberg" variety, with 
only a fraction l/(l+d) of any quantity shipped arriving. 
The problem of firms has two parts. First, they must decide on a 
capacity level. This fixes the path of their output through the 
product cycle. Second, at each point in time they must decide how much 
to sell in each market. Let us for the moment take the capacity choice 
as given, and focus only on the determination of the division of 
output. 
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This choice can be analyzed as follows (the essence of this 
analysis is the same as that in the purely static models presented by 
Brander(1981) and Brander and Krugman(1983)). Each firm will want to 
allocate its current output between markets so that the marginal 
revenue, net of transport cost, of shipping to the two markets is the 
same. Consider the case of a US firm. The marginal revenue it receives 
from shipping an additional unit to the US market is 
where Sy is the share of the firm in the US market, and we will define 
V in a moment. Its marginal revenue from selling in the apanese 
market is 
where S is the share of the firm in the Japanese market. 
The two terms V and V. — and their counterparts V„m and VJJ|t in 
the decision problem of a Japanese firm — are conjectural variations. 
They measure the extent to which a firm expects a one unit increase in 
its own deliveries to a market to increase total deliveries to that 
market, and thus to depress the price. In the simplest case of Cournot 
competition, we would have all four conjectural variations equal to 
one. 
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The use of a conjectural variations approach In modelling 
oligopoly is not a favored one. Many authors have pointed out the 
shaky logical foundations of the approach, and to use it in an 
empirical application adds an uncomfortable element of ad-hockery. We 
introduce these terms now because we have found that we need them; 
indeed, it will become immediately apparent as soon as we discuss 
entry that to reconcile the industry's structure with its technology 
we must abandon the hypothesis of Cournot competition. Whether there 
are alternatives to the conjectural variation approach is a question 
we will return to at the end of the paper. 
Suppose that we suppress our doubts, and accept the conjectural 
variations approach. Then we can notice the following point. Suppose 
that for some P.P*. Sy and Sj the first-order condition MRy = MRj is 
satisfied. Then the condition will continue to be satisfied with the 
same S^ and S, even for different prices, as long as P/P* remains the 
same. 
What this means is that if all firms grow at the same rate, so 
that it is feasible for them to maintain constant market shares, and 
if prices fall at the same rate in both markets, the optimal behavior 
will in fact be to maintain constancy of market shares. Fortunately, 
our assumptions on the yield curve insure that all firms will indeed 
grow at the same rate. Furthermore, if firms continue to divide their 
output in the same proportions between the two markets, the fact that 
all firms grow at the same rate and that the elasticity of demand is 
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assumed constant insures that prices in the two markets will indeed 
fall at the same rate. So we have demonstrated that given the initial 
capacity decisions of the firms, the subsequent equilibrium in the 
product cycle is a sort of balanced growth in which market shares do 
not change but output steadily rises and prices steadily fall. 
We note finally that in principle this equilibrium may be one in 
which there is two-way trade in the same product. Firms with a small 
market share (or a low conjectural variation) in the foreign market 
may choose to "dump" goods in that market, even though the price net 
of transport and tariff costs is less than at home. Since this may be 
true of firms in each country, the result can be two-way trade based 
on reciprocal dumping. 
So far we have discussed equilibrium given the number of firms 
and their capacity choices; our final steps are to consider capacity 
choice and entry. 
Capacity choice 
Following Spence, we will assume that the product cycle is short 
enough that firms do not worry about discounting. Thus the objective 
of a US firm is to maximize 
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subject to the constraint 
where T is the length of the product cycle, z(t) and z*(t) are 
deliveries to the US and Japanese markets respectively, and c is the 
cost of a unit of capacity. 
This maximization problem may be simplified by noting that we 
have already seen that marginal revenue will be the same for 
deliveries to the two markets. Thus we can evaluate the returns from a 
marginal increase in K by assuming that the whole of that increase is 
allocated to the US market. The first-order condition then becomes 
We can rewrite this first order condition in a revealing form. 
First, to simplify notation let us choose units so that the length of 
the product cycle, T, is equal to one. Also, we note that given the 
output path (3) and the elasticity of demand, we have that 
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Substituting and integrating, we find 
[(i+e)/((l-a)e + i)]P(T)(i - asv) - cK~e 
or 
(10) P(l - a S ^ ) = MC0 
where P is the average price received by the firm over the product 
cycle, and thus the whole left term is the average marginal revenue 
over the cycle. The term on the right can be shown to equal the 
marginal cost of producing one more unit of total cycle output. Thus 
we see that our problem can be expressed in a form that is effectively 
the same as one where economies of scale are purely static. Something 
that looks like marginal revenue is set equal to something that looks 
like marginal cost. 
This means that we can solve for equilibrium by collapsing the 
problem into an equivalent static problem. Given the balanced growth 
character of the equilibrium, there is a one-to-one relationship 
between total deliveries to each market and the average price, which 
continues to take a constant elasticity form: 
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And we can write an average cost function for cumulative output which 
takes the form 
(12) C « Cux~e/(1+8) 
A model of the form (10)-(12) may be solved using methods 
described in Brander and Krugman(1983) and Krugman(1984). For any 
given marginal costs we can solve for equilibrium prices and market 
shares. From prices we can determine total sales, and using market 
shares use this to find output per firm. This output, however, implies 
a marginal cost. A full equilibrium is a fixed point where the 
marginal costs assumed at the beginning are the same as those implied 
at the end. In practice such an equilibrium can easily be calculated 
using an iterative procedure. We make a guess at the marginal costs, 
solve for output, use this to recompute the marginal costs, and 
continue until convergence. 
Once we have solved this collapsed problem, we can then solve for 




Finally, we turn to the problem of entry. Here we assume that 
there are many potential entrants with the same costs, and that all 
potential entrants have perfect foresight about the post-entry 
equilibrium. An equilibrium with entry must then satisfy two criteria: 
it must yield non-negative profits for all those firms who do enter, 
but any additional firm that might enter would face losses. If we 
could ignore integer constraints this would imply a zero-profit 
equilibrium. In practice this will not be quite the case. However, as 
we will see, our estimates of profits turn out to be quite small. 
An important point about the relationship between entry and 
conjectural variations should be noted. This is that the conjectural 
variations must be high — that is, post-entry firms had better not be 
too competitive — if there are strong increases in yield. To see 
this, consider a single market with elasticity of demand 1/ot and yield 
curve parameter e, where all firms are the same. Then the number of 
firms that can earn zero profits can be shown to be a(l+e)V/e, where V 
is the conjectural variation. For the estimates of a and e that we 
will be using, this turns out to be 1.98V. That is, with Cournot 
behavior only 2 firms could earn zero profits. Not surprisingly, in 
order to rationalize the existence of the six large US firms that 
actually competed, and who furthermore faced some foreign competition, 
we end up needing to postulate behavior a good deal less competitive 
than Cournot. 
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We have now described a theoretical model of competition in an 
industry that we hope captures some of the essentials of the Random 
Access Memory market. Our next step is to try to make this model 
operational using realistic numbers. 
CALIBRATING THE MODEL 
Our theoretical model of the random access memory market is 
recognizably one in which protection of the domestic market will in 
effect push a firm down its marginal cost curve and lead to a larger 
share of the export market as well. What we want to do, however, is to 
quantify this effect. To do this, we need to choose realistic 
parameter values. What we did was to take outside estimates for some 
of the parameters, then use data on the industry to calibrate the 
model to fix the remaining parameters. 
Parameters from outside estimates 
The parameters for which we took numbers directly from other 
sources were the elasticity of demand, a; the elasticity of the yield 
curve, 6; and the transport cost d. 
Finan and Amundsen (1985) estimates demand elasticity at 1.8 for 
the US market. In fact we can confirm that this must be at least 
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approximately right by comparing the fall in prices and the rise in 
quantity over the period 1978-1981, i.e., over the period when 16K 
RAMs were the dominant memory chip. Prices fell by a logarithmic 142 
percent over that period, while sales rose by 233 percent, 1.6 times 
as much, despite a recession and high interest rates that depressed 
investment. In general, it is apparent that the elasticity of demand 
for semiconductor memories must be more than one but not too much 
more, given that the price per bit has fallen 99 percent in real terms 
over the past decade. If demand were inelastic, the industry would 
have shrunk away; if it were very elastic, we would be having chips 
with everything by now. 
The elasticity of the yield curve can, as we noted in our earlier 
discussion, be derived from the elasticity of the associated learning 
curve. Discussions of learning curves in general often offer numbers 
in the 0.2-0.3 range. An Office of Technology Assessment study (Office 
of Technology Assessment, 1983) estimated the slope of the learning 
curve for semiconductors at 0.28. Converted to yield curve form, this 
implies e = 0.3889. 
Finally, there is general agreement that costs of transporting 
semiconductors internationally are low, as one would expect given the 




The data in Tables 2 and 3 show fourteen firms in three markets. 
If we were to try to represent the complete structure of the industry, 
we would need to specify 14 cost functions and 42 conjectural 
variations parameters. Instead, we have stylized the market in such a 
way as to need to specify only two cost parameters and four 
conjectural variations. 
The less important step in this stylization is the consolidation 
of the US and ROW markets into a single market. This may be justified 
on the grounds that transport costs are small, and the crucial issue 
is the alleged closure of the Japanese market. Also, as our data 
suggests, the market share of US firms in the US and ROW markets is 
fairly similar. 
The more important step is the representation of the US and 
Japanese industries as a group of symmetrical representative firms. 
There are many objections to this procedure. The essential problem is 
that the size distribution of firms presumably has some meaning, and 
to collapse it in this way means that we are neglecting potentially 
important aspects of reality. As with the other problematic 
assumptions in this paper, this should be viewed as a simplification 
that we hope is not crucial. 
In Table 2 we noted that there were nine firms with market shares 
over five percent: six US and three Japanese. We represent the 
industry by treating it as if these were the only firms, and as if all 
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firms from each country were the same. Thus our model industry 
consists of six equal-cost US firms, which share the entire US market 
share, and three equal-cost Japanese firms, which do the same for 
Japan's market shares. 
We do not have direct data on costs. Instead, we attempt to infer 
costs by assuming that in the actual case firms earned precisely zero 
profits. As we know, because of integer constraints this need not have 
been the case. It should have been close, however, and it allows us to 
use price and output data to infer costs. 
First, we have data on prices. This data shows that from 1978-
1983 the average price of a 16K RAM was identical in the two markets, 
at 1.47 dollars. There is reason to suspect this data, since the 
Japanese had been threatened with an anti-dumping action and the 
structure of the Japanese industry may have made it easy for effective 
prices to differ from those posted. Lacking any information on this, 
however, we will go with the official data. 
Next, we use our stylized industry structure to calculate the per 
firm sales in each market. These are shown in the first part of Table 
4. Given this information, we can net out transport costs on foreign 
sales to calculate the average revenue of a representative firm of 
each type: that is, 
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for a US firm. 
But the zero profit assumption allows us to infer that average 
cost is equal to average revenue. This in turn implies both the level 
of marginal cost and the constant term in the average cost function: 
MCy m AR/(l+e) 
Cy - AR(X8/1+e) 
where X is cumulative output. 
When we solve these equations we find that 
MCy - 1.054 
MCj « 1.040 
Cy « 3.524 
Cj m 3.733 
This says that US firms would have had somewhat lower (about 6 
percent) costs if they had had the same output as their Japanese 
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rivals, but that Japanese firms, thanks to larger scale, ended up with 
very slightly lower marginal costs. 
This result confirms what industry experts have claimed in a 
qualitative sense about the industry. Most estimates based on direct 
observation have given US firms a larger inherent cost advantage — 
Finan and Amundsen (1985) suggests 10-15 percent. Given the roundabout 
nature of our method, and the problems of some of our data, we would 
not quarrel with this. 
One might wonder about the coincidence that costs in the two 
countries appear to be so close. Is there something about our method 
that forces this? The answer, we believe, is that this is a result of 
our method of selecting an industry to study. The 16K RAM was the 
first semiconductor in which Japan became an exporter on a large 
scale. Not surprisingly, it is one in which costs were close. Had we 
done the 4K RAM, in which Japanese firms sold only to a protected 
domestic market, or the 64K RAM, in which they came to be the dominant 
producers, we would presumably have found quite different answers. 
Conjectural variations 
Our next step is to calculate conjectural variations parameters. 
We begin with per firm market shares: these are shown in the second 
part of Table 4. 
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We next note the relationship between average prices, market 
shares, and marginal cost: 
for US firms in the US market, and similarly for Japanese firms in the 
two markets. Note that we cannot use this method to estimate the 
conjectural variation for US firms in the Japanese market. The reason 
is that the whole point of this study is the allegation that US firms 
were constrained by implicit trade barriers from selling as much as 
they would have under free trade. 
When we solve these equations for the conjectural variations, we 
find 
What about the US conjectural variation in the Japanese market? 
Here it is impossible to disentangle the effects of US behavior and 
whatever implicit protection Japan imposed. This is a key point on 
which there seems to be nothing we can do except, make an assumption. 
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Our assumption is this: US firms have the same conjectural variation 
in the Japanese market that they do at home. Thus we assume 
vj - vu - 3- 7 6 0 
This conjecture would lead to a substantially higher US market 
share in Japan than we actually observe. The difference we attribute 
to protection. This protection can be represented by an implicit 
tariff. The implicit tariff rate necessary to reproduce the actual 
market share is 0.2637. 
There are two points to note about these results. First, we note 
that all three estimated conjectural variations are substantially more 
than one; i.e., the market is less competitive than Cournot. This is 
an inevitable consequence of the high degree of economies of scale 
that we have assumed, together with the zero-profit condition. 
Relatively uncompetitive behavior is neede to rationalize how many 
firms there are in the market. Second, Japanese firms seem to have 
been very cautious about selling in the US market. Is this number 
picking up concerns about US trade policy, or is it simply an artifact 
of our model? In general the conjectural variations are not too 
plausible; we will consider in our conculding section what this 
implies for our general approach. 
We have now calibrated the model to the data. That is, when the 
model is simulated using our assumed parameters it reproduces the 
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actual prices, outputs, and market shares of the 16K RAM product 
cycle. We summarize this baseline case in Table 5. Our next step is to 
ask how the results change under alternative policies. 
EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES 
We consider two alternative policies. First is free trade, 
represented in our model by a removal of the implicit tariff on US 
sales to Japan. Second is a trade war, in which both countries block 
imports. The effects of the two policies are shown next to the 
baseline case in Table 5. 
It is important to note the underlying assumptions behind these 
calculations. In each case all parameters are assumed constant, except 
for the implicit tariff on US exports to Japan. In particular, the 
conjectural variations are assumed to remain unchanged. This is not a 
particularly satisfactory assumption, but of course if we allow these 
parameters to change anything can happen. 
To solve the model in each case, we followed a two-stage 
procedure. First, we took the initial number of firms and iterated on 
marginal cost to get the equilibrium. Then we searched across a grid 
of numbers of Japanese and US firms to find an entry equilibrium. 
Free trade 
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Our first policy experiment goes to the heart of the debate over 
Japanese trade policy. We ask what would have happened if the Japanese 
market had been open. This is done by removing the implicit tariff on 
Us exports to Japan. 
The results, reported in the second column of Table 5, are quite 
striking. According to our model, in the absence of protection, the 
Japanese firms that were net exporters in the baseline case do not 
even enter; only US firms remain in the field. The reason is a sort 
circular causation typical in models with scale economies. Japanese 
firms, deprived of their safe haven in the domestic market, would have 
smaller cumulative output even with constant marginal cost. The 
smaller output, however, means a higher marginal cost. This implies 
still smaller output, which implies still higher marginal cost, and so 
on. In the end, no Japanese firms find it profitable to enter. 
The exit of the Japanese firms, and the new access to the 
Japanese market, produce an increase in the profits of the US firms. 
It turns out that this increase allows an additional US firm to enter. 
Increased competition, combined with larger output and hence lower 
marginal cost of the US firms leads to a fall in price in both 
markets. 
The lower price means an increase in consumer surplus in both 
countries. In the US this is supplemented with a small rise in 
profits. The result is a gain in welfare, measured as the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus, in both nations. 
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If we reverse the order in which we consider the first two 
columns of Table 5, we can arrive at an evaluation of the effects of 
Japanese policy. According to our estimates, privileged access to the 
domestic market was crucial, not only in providing Japanese firms with 
domestic sales, but in allowing them to get their marginal cost down 
to the point where they could successfully export. However, this 
result of protection was a Pyrrhic victory in welfare terms. It raised 
Japanese prices, hurting consumers, without generating compensating 
producer gains. The policy was thus not a successful beggar-my-
neighbor one, or more accurately it beggared my neighbor only at the 
cost of beggaring myself as well. 
Trade war 
Although a Japanese policy of export promotion through home 
Market protection does not seem to be desirable even in and of itself, 
it is easy to imagine that it could provoke retaliation. The third 
column of Table 5 asks what would have happened if Japan and the US 
had engaged in a "trade war" in 16K RAMs, with each blocking all 
imports from the other. (For the purposes of the simulation, we 
achieved this by letting each country impose a 100 percent tariff). 
The result of this trade war is unfavorable for both countries. 
Firms are smaller, and thus have higher marginal cost. Prices are 
therefore higher in both markets, though especially in the smaller 
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Japanese market. Small profits do not compensate for the loss of 
consumer surplus, so welfare is reduced in both nations. 
This trade war example makes a point that has been mentioned in 
some discussion of high technology industries but needs further 
emphasis. While the nonclassical aspects of these industries offer 
potential justifications for government intervention, they also tend 
to magnify the costs of protection and trade conflict. We have a case 
of two countries with very similar inherent costs, i.e., little 
comparative advantage. In a constant-returns, perfect competition 
situation this would mean that a trade war would have few costs. In 
this case, however, protection leads to reduced competition and 
reduced scale, imposing substantial losses. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The results of our simulation analysis seem fairly clear. What we 
want to focus on in our conclusion are the difficulties with the 
analysis and directions for further work. 
The difficulties with the model, as it stands, are of two kinds. 
First, it is disturbing that we are forced to rely on conjectural 
variations to make the model track reality, and still more disturbing 
that the conjectural variations are estimated to be such high numbers. 
Second, our characterization of the technology, while extremely 
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convenient as a simplification, may simplify too much. As we will 
argue in a moment, these two difficulties may be related. 
Conjectural variations 
Our reliance on conjectural variations, and the large value of 
these conjectures, is forced by two factors. First is the relatively 
large number of firms operating in the market. Second is the high 
learning curve elasticity we have taken from other sources. These 
imply that firms can only be making nonnegative profits if they have 
conjectural variations well in excess of one. 
If this result is wrong, it must be because one of the parameters 
is mismeasured. One possibility would be that firms are in fact 
producing imperfect substitutes, so that the elasticity of demand 
faced by each firm is lower than our perfect-substitutes calculation 
indicates. This seems implausible, however, given what we know about 
the applications of RAMs. The alternative possibility is that the 
degree of scale economies is in some way overstated. 
Now we know that in fact extremely rapid learning took place, and 
more important was expected to take place in RAMs. This would seem to 
imply large dynamic scale economies. However, it is possible that the 
pace of learning was more a matter of time elapsed than of cumulative 
output. If this was the case, large firms would not have had as great 
an advantage over small as we have assumed. A reduction in our 
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estimate of the effective degree of scale economies would in turn 
reduce the need to rely on conjectural variations to track the data. 
We should note, however, that the conventional wisom of the industry 
is that cumulative output, not time alone, is the source of learning. 
Even if the learning curve was as steep as we have assumed, the 
longer-term dynamics of technological change offer an alternative 
route by which effective scale economies could have been lower than we 
say. To see this, however, we need to turn to our second problem, the 
nature of technological competition. 
Technological competition 
In order to simplify the analysis, we have assumed that the 
competition for each generation of semiconductor memories in effect 
stands in isolation. The techniques to construct a new size memory 
become availiable, and firms are off in a race to learn. This approach 
neglects three things. On one side, it neglects the R&D that is 
invloved in the endogenous development of each generation. On the 
other side, it neglects two technological linkages that might be 
important. One is the link between successive generations of memories; 
the other is the link between memories and other semiconductor 
products. 
The endogenous development of new generations, in and of itself, 
actually adds a further degree of dynamic scale economies. Firms 
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invest in front-end R&D, which acts like a fixed cost. This should 
actually require still higher conjectural variations to justify the 
number of firms in the industry. 
On the other side, technological linkages could help to explain 
why so many firms produced 16K RAMs. It has sometimes been asserted 
that you must produce 16Ks to be able to get into 64Ks, etc. (although 
Intel, for example, made a decision to skip a generation so as to 
leapfrog its competitiors). It has also been asserted that Firms 
producing other kinds of semiconductors need a base of volume 
production on which to hone their manufacturing skills, and that 
commodity products like memories are the only places they can do this. 
Either of these linkages could have the effect of making firms willing 
to accept direct losses in RAM production in order to generate intra-
firm spillovers to current or future lines of business. 
It should be pointed out, however, that these spillovers can 
explain the presence of a larger number of firms in RAM production 
only if they involve a diminishing marginal product to memory 
production. That is, they must take the form of gains that you get by 
having a foothold in the RAM sector, but that do not require a 
dominant presence. Otherwise, the effect will simple be to make 
competition in RAMs more intense, with lower prices offsetting the 
extra incentive to participate. 
But if the linkages take this form, they will reduce the degree 
of economies of scale relevant for competition. Firms will view the 
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marginal cost of production as the actual cost less technological 
spillovers, but these spillovers will decline as output rises, leaving 
economic marginal cost less downward-sloping than direct cost. Of 
course if true marginal costs are less downward-sloping than we have 
estimated, we have less need of conjectural variations to explain the 
number of firms. 
What to make of the results 
Our concluding remarks have been skeptical about some of the 
underlying structure of the model. It is at least possible that the 
data can be reinterpreted in a way that leads us to a substantially 
lower estimate of dynamic scale economies. If this were the case, the 
results of our simulation exercises would be much less striking. On 
the other hand, the view that in a dynamic industry like 
semiconductors, where US firms were widely agreed to still have a cost 
advantage in the late 1970s, protection may have been the key to 
Japanese success is not implausible. 
The final judgement must then be that this is a preliminary 
attempt, not the final word. We believe, however, that it has been 
useful. It is crucial that study of trade policy in dynamic industries 
go beyond the unsupported assertions that are so common and attempt 
quantification. We expect that the techniques for doing this will get 
much better than what we have managed here, but this is at least a 
first try. 
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APPENDIX: ESTIMATION OF MARKET SHARES 
A key set of variables in our model calibration is the share of 
each regions consumption of RAMs by country of origin. Unfortunately, 
we were not able to obtain direct numbers on these shares. The numbers 
presented in Table 3 were estimated indirectly. 
Our estimation procedure used three separate sources of data, 
together with the assumption that the pattern of consumption of RAMs 
is identical to that of all integrated circuits. Figures on total 
regional consumption of ICs as a whole are readily available. Numbers 
on the regional consumption of ICs by country of origin are also 
available for the US and Japan. We took both these sets of numbers 
from Finan and Amundsen (1985), Tables 2-8, 2-12, and 2-13. Lastly, we 
can get worldwide consumption of RAMs from our production data, taken 
from Dataquest. 
By assuming that RAM consumption is a constant fraction of total 
IC consumption, we can establish the size of the US, Japanese, and 
rest of world (ROW) markets for 16K RAMs. Next we breask down the US 
and Japanese consumption by country of origian by using the regional 
consumption by country of origin figures for all ICs. The procedure to 
this point has yielded the first two rows of Table 3. The last row is 
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then calculated as a residual. From our Dataquest figures on firm 
production, we can determine the total output of both US and Japanese 
firms. Since the sum of the columns in table 3 must equal this total 
output we arrive at the third row by subtraction. 
RAM sales by market and country of origin were calculated for 
each year of our samle. We then summed across all years to get the 16K 
RAM consumption by country of origin for the whole product cycle. 
These numbers were then converted into percentages for the table. 
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